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Abstract
We develop a medium-size semi-structural time series model of inflation dynamics that is
consistent with the view – often expressed by central banks – that three components are im-
portant: a trend anchored by long-run expectations, a Phillips curve and temporary fluctuations
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in energy prices. We find that a stable long-term inflation trend and a well identified steep Phil-
lips curve are consistent with the data, but they imply potential output declining since the new
millennium and energy prices affecting headline inflation not only via the Phillips curve but
also via an independent expectational channel.
Keywords: Phillips curve, inflation dynamics, output gap, Okun’s law, unobserved components, Bayesian
estimation. JEL Classification: C11, C32, C53, E31, E32, E52.
Inflation is characterized by an underlying trend that has been essentially constant since the
mid-1990s; [. . . ]. Theory and evidence suggest that this trend is strongly influenced by in-
flation expectations that, in turn, depend on monetary policy. In particular, the remarkable
stability of various measures of expected inflation in recent years presumably represents the
fruits of the Federal Reserve’s sustained effort since the early 1980s to bring down and stabilize
inflation at a low level. The anchoring of inflation expectations [. . . ] does not, however, pre-
vent actual inflation from fluctuating from year to year in response to the temporary influence
of movements in energy prices and other disturbances. In addition, inflation will tend to run
above or below its underlying trend to the extent that resource utilization – which may serve
as an indicator of firms’ marginal costs – is persistently high or low.
Yellen (2016), ‘Macroeconomic Research After the Crisis’
Speech for the 60th Boston Fed Conference
The quote by Janet Yellen reflects a view, widely shared by policy makers and central bankers, which
maintains that three components matter for inflation dynamics: trend-expectations, oil prices, and the degree
of resource utilisation in the economy. Similarly, most macroeconomic modelling is based on these three
core ideas: some measure of slack affects short term fluctuations of inflation via a Phillips curve; monetary
policy, via expectations, shapes its long run trend; and oil price and other idiosyncratic shocks explain the
volatile component of headline inflation. While models that incorporate these ideas use a variety of different
auxiliary assumptions (for example on the nature of expectations, the functional form of key equations, and
the channels of propagation of the shocks) these three components remain the building blocks of a shared
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narrative. In this paper, we call this broadly and loosely defined understanding of inflation dynamics the
‘Fed’s view’.
Recent empirical evidence has challenged this view. Indeed, the literature presents a wide range of
contrasting findings, including on the existence, stability, and steepness of the slope of the Phillips curve,
and regarding the degree of anchoring of inflation expectations.1 First, many studies have found the Phillips
curve to be unstable, hard to identify, and weak or disappearing in recent samples (see results and discus-
sions in I.M.F., 2013, Ball and Mazumder, 2011, Blanchard et al., 2015 and McLeay and Tenreyro, 2018).
Second, Phillips curve based forecasting models have been shown to perform poorly with respect to naive
benchmarks, pointing to the irrelevance of slack measures for explaining inflation dynamics (see, Atkeson
and Ohanian, 2001, Stock and Watson, 2007, 2009, and also Dotsey et al., 2011, Cecchetti et al., 2017, and
Forbes et al., 2018 for recent evidence and relevant discussion). Third, a small but increasingly important
literature has challenged the idea that expectations are fully anchored and forward-looking. For example,
papers have connected the ‘missing disinflation puzzle’ of the post-2008 crisis period to the partial disan-
choring of consumers’ inflation expectations that, in turn, can be accounted for by the evolution of oil prices
(see Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2015, and Coibion et al., 2017).
This paper revisits some of the evidence on the reduced form Phillips curve, in the spirit of Phillips
(1958), by assessing the Fed’s view of inflation dynamics through the lens of a stylised statistical model that
is informed by economic theory and incorporates economic expectations while allowing for deviations from
perfect information and full rationality. Our modelling strategy can be defined as ‘semi-structural’ since it
incorporates minimal identifying assumptions from a general class of economic models, but lets the data
speak on key aspects, such as expectation formation, the nature of the Phillips curve, and the role of oil
1A survey of the extensive empirical literature on the PC is beyond the scope of this paper. For a recent
survey of the New Keynesian Phillips curve focussing on univariate limited-information methods, see Mav-
roeidis et al. (2014) For a review of results using full-information methods to estimate dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) models, see An and Schorfheide (2007). Nakamura and Steinsson (2013) re-
view the use of microeconomic data to study price dynamics. Coibion et al. (2017) discuss the incorporation
of survey data on inflation expectations in models of inflation dynamics. Other surveys, providing comple-
mentary approaches, include Henry and Pagan (2004), Ólafsson (2006), Rudd and Whelan (2007), Nason
and Smith (2008), Gordon (2011), and Tsoukis et al. (2011).
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prices. In this sense it occupies the middle ground between a fully specified Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium (DSGE) model and a Vector Auto Regressive (VAR) model.
Our specification in reduced form is compatible with and nests several potentially different forward- and
backward-looking structural Phillips curve models, including the standard New-Keynesian Phillips curve
(NKPC), in which inflation is a purely forward-looking process, driven by expectations of future real eco-
nomic activity. Moreover, the model allows survey data on agents’ expectations on inflation to depart from
the full-information rational expectations benchmark without imposing any specific form of information
frictions. We do not require either of the two surveys to be an efficient and unbiased predictor of future
inflation and allow for temporary and permanent deviations from a rational forecast, potentially capturing
measurement and observational errors, as well as a time-dependent bias in inflation expectations.
A key feature of the approach is the modelling of oil prices and the different channels through which
energy prices can affect inflation. One way is through production marginal costs and the Phillips curve –
oil prices can affect the business cycle component and hence co-determine the output gap.2 Furthermore,
in the model, oil disturbances can affect headline prices directly via energy services, which are part of the
consumption basket, but also potentially via expectation formation, in line with the findings of Coibion and
Gorodnichenko (2015). These two channels are captured by studying the differential impact of a second
cycle, that we label ‘energy price cycle’, on headline and core inflation. The energy price cycle captures the
potential common dynamics between oil prices, inflation expectations, and inflation but it does not affect
the domestic output gap and the real variables.3,4
2A large and important literature has analysed the connection between demand and supply oil shocks and
the business cycles (see, for example, Baumeister and Kilian, 2016, Hamilton, 2013, Kilian and Vigfusson,
2017).
3Our assumption of an energy price cycle orthogonal to the business cycle and not affecting the real
variables should not be seen as literally present in the data structure. It is a convenient statistical device
which helps teasing out components in the price dynamics, at higher frequencies than those of the standard
business cycle, and that can have weak or negligible impact on the US output gap and labour market.
4In an extension of the model which includes proxies of global economic activity we analyse whether
the energy price cycle reflects global demand and the commodity price cycle. Our results suggest that the
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Inflation is modelled as being driven by three components: (i) long term inflation expectations; (ii) a sta-
tionary stochastic cycle, which captures multivariate and lagged commonalities in real, nominal (including
energy prices) and labour market variables at business cycle frequencies. This cycle connects the output gap
to prices and their expectations via a Phillips curve relationship and to unemployment via the Okun’s law;
(iii) a stationary stochastic cycle capturing the common dynamics between oil prices, inflation expectations,
and CPI inflation but not affecting real variables. The model also identifies other key economic objects such
as output potential, trend employment, and equilibrium unemployment, in the form of unit root trends.
Results suggest that the Phillips curve is alive and well and has been fairly stable since the early 1980s.5
Importantly, our cycle decomposition shows that the business cycle is not always the dominant compon-
ent. Large oil price fluctuations can move prices away from the real-nominal relationship both by directly
impacting energy services prices and by shifting consumers’ expectations away from the rational forecast
– ‘disanchoring’ them – and hence inducing expectation driven fluctuations in prices. This result confirms
the intuition of Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015). We provide confirmation of the importance of using
expectational data to identify both trend inflation and the Phillips curve, while dealing with disturbances
to expectations that, albeit reflected in inflation, are unrelated to real variables and fundamentals. From a
policy perspective, the stable inflation trend is an indication of the Fed’s success in anchoring expectations.
However, our results also point to the challenges that policymakers have to overcome in guiding expectations
and stabilising the economy in the presence of large energy price disturbances.
There are several by-products of our analysis: we obtain a model-consistent estimate of the output
gap and potential output; we also assess the stability of Okun’s law and the quality of core inflation as an
indicator of underlying inflation. Indeed, our approach generates an indicator of cyclical inflation which is
energy price cycle is associated with oil supply shocks and financial shocks in the commodity markets rather
than global demand.
5While we observe that a fixed parameter model is able to capture a stable Phillips curve from the 1980s,
it is possible that time-variation in the parameters or stochastic volatility may be important over a longer
sample (see Stock and Watson, 2007; Mertens and Nason, 2017). We do not explore this possibility in
this paper. Indeed, estimation uncertainty is likely to obfuscate all gains coming from a more sophisticated
model.
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clean not only from the direct effect of oil prices, as is the case for core inflation, but also from their indirect
effects.
The paper starts with a brief discussion of our methodology and related literature, in the remainder
of this section. In section 2 we then introduce a stylised model of inflation dynamics which provides the
intuition for our approach. In section 3 and 4 we specify the empirical model while in section 5 and 6 we
discuss empirical results. The last section concludes. The Online Appendix provides details on the Bayesian
estimation of the model, an out-of-sample forecasting evaluation, additional results, and colour charts for all
of the models discussed in the paper.
Contribution and Related Literature. From the statistical point of view, the model has a number
of attractive features: it does not rely on arbitrary preliminary detrending of the data which may create
distortions, it contains a rich lag structure allowing us to capture dynamic heterogeneity amongst variables,
it allows us to perform conjunctural analysis and historical decompositions of variables into cyclical and
trend components, and it is sufficiently efficient and parsimonious to be used as a forecasting tool. The unit
root trend common to inflation and inflation forecasts can be related to agents’ long-term expectations, under
the assumption that the ‘law of iterated expectations’ holds (see Beveridge and Nelson, 1981 and Mertens,
2016). In fact, the impact of all transitory components has to be zero in the long run.6
Our econometric representation is general in the sense described but has a structure that is motivated
by the objective of parsimony. Indeed, our model can be understood as a restricted VAR model where, by
adopting minimal economic restrictions to identify the potentially different dynamic components of infla-
tion, we induce ‘informed’ parsimony thereby helping with signal extraction and forecasting. The proposed
decomposition leads to a rather complex state space form. In order to deal with this complexity, we estimate
the model using Bayesian methods. A Bayesian approach in the context of a similar but simpler model has
been proposed by Planas et al. (2008) who implement a Bayesian version of the work of Kuttner (1994), by
Grant and Chan (2017) who propose a Bayesian model comparison focussing on trend-cycle decompositions
of output and, more recently, by Lenza and Jarocin´ski (2016). The latter paper is the closest to our work but
focuses on estimating measures of the output gap in the Euro Area rather than on providing a decomposition
that can be used for studying the drivers of inflation dynamics. Our paper also shares a similar approach and
6A discussion on the conditions under which survey data can be employed to study the PC is in Adam
and Padula (2011).
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methodology with Del Negro et al. (2017), who employ a flexible VAR model that incorporates long-term
survey expectations, to estimate common trends and study the natural rate of interest in the US.
Our work builds on the tradition of structural time series models (see Harvey, 1985), where observed
time series are modelled as the sum of unobserved components: common and idiosyncratic trends, and
cycles. In doing this, and by focussing on inflation dynamics, this paper relates to the literature on the
output gap, the Phillips curve, and trend inflation estimation with unobserved components models, started
by Kuttner (1994). Similarly to Bas¸türk et al. (2014) and Lenza and Jarocin´ski (2016), we do not pre-filter
data to stationarity, but model their low frequency behaviour by allowing for trends. As in Gordon (1982)
and Basistha and Startz (2008), we use multiple real activity indicators to increase the reliability of the
output gap estimates. Also, our work relates to a number of papers which have studied trend inflation in
unobserved component models augmented with data on medium-/long-term inflation expectations, as for
example, Clark and Doh (2014), and Mertens (2016).
2 A Stylised Model for Inflation Dynamics
At the core of our empirical approach lies a stylised full information rational expectations model for inflation
and output. In this section we discuss the intuition and basic building blocks. We assume that inflation and
output can be decomposed into three components: (i) independent trends determining output potential µyt
and trend inflation µpit ; (ii) a common stationary cycle relating nominal and real variables (the output cycle
is interpreted as the output gap) ψ̂t ; and (iii) some independent (white noise) disturbances to output and
inflation, ψyt and ψpit , that can be thought of as classic measurement error or idiosyncratic shocks. We have:
yt = µyt + ψ̂t +ψ
y
t , (1)
pit = µpit +δpi ψ̂t +ψ
pi
t , (2)
where the independent trends are assumed to be unit-root processes (with a drift in output)
µyt = µ0+µ
y
t−1+u
y
t , (3)
µpit = µ
pi
t−1+u
pi
t . (4)
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The economic interpretation of the different trend and cycle components is standard (see, for example
the discussion in Yellen, 2015). The output trend – i.e. the output potential, capturing the long-term growth
of the economy – is usually thought of as driven by technological innovation. Inflation fluctuates around a
longer-term trend that, at least in recent times, has been essentially stable. Theory relates this trend inflation
to inflation expectations that, in turn, are shaped by the conduct of monetary policy – for example, by
policymakers’ targets. Shocks of a different nature can impact marginal production costs and modify the
intensity of resource utilisation in the economy, thus, temporarily pushing output away from its balanced
growth path. The shortfall of actual GDP from potential output is the output gap ψ̂t . The slack in the
economy is reflected in the short-run cyclical fluctuations of inflation around its trend, in the presence
of price rigidity. This relationship is generally described by an expectations-augmented Phillips curve in
theoretical models. Finally, a nontrivial fraction of the quarter-to-quarter variability of inflation and output
is attributable to independent and idiosyncratic shocks.
In line with the econometric literature on the output gap, we assume that ψ̂t is a stationary process with
stochastic cyclical behaviour. The simplest process allowing for such a stochastic cycle is an AR(2) process
with complex roots of the form
ψ̂t = α1ψ̂t−1+α2ψ̂t−2+ vt . (5)
Indeed, the AR(2) model can be written in a different and slightly more general form, displaying its pseudo-
cyclical behaviour more clearly , i.e.
ψ̂t = ρ cos(λ )ψ̂t−1+ρ sin(λ )ψ̂∗t−1+ vt , (6)
ψ̂∗t =−ρ sin(λ )ψ̂t−1+ρ cos(λ )ψ̂∗t−1+ v∗t ,
where the parameters 0 ≤ λ ≤ pi and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 can be interpreted, respectively, as the frequency of the
cycle and the damping factor on the amplitude while ψ̂∗t is a modelling auxiliary cycle and vt and v∗t are
uncorrelated white noise disturbances (see Harvey, 1990).7 The disturbances make the cycle stochastic
rather than deterministic and, if ρ < 1, the process is stationary.
7It is straightforward to show that the model can be rewritten as
(1−2ρ cos(λ )L+ρ2L2)ψ̂t = (1−ρ cos(λ )L)vt +(ρ sin(λ )L)v∗t .
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By assuming an output gap that is a stationary solution to an AR(2) process, the model in Eq. (1-2)
admits a hybrid expectations-augmented New Keynesian Phillips Curve connecting the cyclical components
of output, inflation, and inflation expectations, of the form
pit =
2
∑
i=1
δipit−i+βEt [pit+1]+κ ŷt + εt , (7)
where hats indicate deviations from trends.8 In this model, rational expectations agents correctly form
model-consistent expectations about inflation, that is
Et [pit+1] = Et
[
µpit+1+δpi ψ̂t+1+ψ
pi
t+1
]
= µpit +δpi(α1ψ̂t +α2ψ̂t−1)
= µpit +δexp,1ψ̂t +δexp,2ψ̂t−1 .
The model can be written, in a compact reduced form representation in terms of the common cycle, the
trend common to inflation and inflation expectations, and the trend capturing output potential (as well as the
idiosyncratic disturbances):

yt
pit
Et [pit+1]
=

1 0
δpi 1
δexp,1+δexp,2L 1

 ψ̂t
µpit
+

µyt
0
0
+

ψyt
ψpit
0
 . (8)
In principle, this simple set of equations can also accommodate different specifications for the Phillips
Curve, under suitable parameter restrictions. For example, an AR(1) ψ̂t would be the solution to a purely
Hence, under the restriction σ2v = 0, the solution of the model is an AR(2), otherwise an ARMA(2,1). The
intuition for the use of the auxiliary cycle is closely related to the standard multivariate AR(1) representation
of univariate AR(p) processes.
8Empirical studies often feature hybrid Phillips curves to account for inflation persistence (a recent sur-
vey is in Tsoukis et al., 2011). Several different mechanisms have been proposed in the literature to introduce
hybrid Phillips curves such as indexation assumptions (e.g. Galí and Gertler, 1999), state-contingent pricing
(e.g. Dotsey et al., 1999), or deviations from rational expectations assumption (e.g. Erceg and Levin, 2003;
Milani, 2007).
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forward looking New-Keynesian Phillips Curve. It also nests the backwards looking ‘Old-Keynesian’ Phil-
lips curve connecting output gap and prices – as in the ‘triangle model of inflation’ (see Gordon, 1982,
1990).
Also, in line with the interpretation proposed, it is worth noting that trend inflation corresponds to the
long-run forecast for inflation, which implies
lim
h→∞
Et [pit+h] = µpit , (9)
in the spirit of Beveridge and Nelson (1981), and that trend output informs expectations of growth in the
long run:
lim
h→∞
Et [yt+h] = lim
h→∞
{µ0h+µyt } . (10)
While such a stylised rational expectations model can provide the gist of the intuition for our economet-
ric model, it is likely to be too simple as an empirical representation of business cycle dynamics.9 First, it
does not allow for dynamic heterogeneity, and hence nominal and real variables fluctuate only as contem-
poraneously connected by the slack in the economy, in contrast with the evidence that prices and labour
market variables respond with lags to the slack in production. In fact, output is linked to unemployment via
Okun’s law and to inflation via the Phillips curve relationship which may involve lagging dynamics. These
fundamental relationships connect potentially different measures of the slack in the economy, such as the
output gap and the cyclical component of unemployment – i.e. the difference between the unemployment
rate and its normal long-run level (equilibrium unemployment)10 – and inform fluctuations at business cycle
frequency in other real and nominal variables.
Second, in modelling price dynamics, forecasters and policymakers often distinguish between changes
in energy and food prices – which enter into headline inflation – and movements in the prices of other goods
9An estimated version of this model provides an unsatisfactory representation of the structure of the
data. Results are available in the Online Appendix D.
10For example, the measure of slack that is adopted in policy analysis by the Fed is obtained as the
difference between the unemployment rate and the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) historical series
for the long-run natural rate (as in Yellen, 2015).
10
and services – that is, core inflation.11 This is because food and energy prices tend to be extremely volatile
and influenced by factors that are disconnected from the slack in the economy and that are beyond the
control of monetary policy. Examples are international political events – as is the case for oil price – as well
as weather or diseases – as for food and beverages.12 This decomposition is important to study how slack
in real output is transmitted to prices, by separating the direct impact of energy price shocks onto energy
products, from their role as cost push shocks in production.
Finally, it has been argued in the literature that, once inflation expectations are admitted to a forward-
or backward-looking Phillips curve equation, it is also possible that economic disturbances impact prices
without any intermediating transmission through the output gap or other measures of slack in the economy
(see, for example, Sims, 2008). In this spirit, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) argue that the absence
of disinflation during the Great Recession can be explained by the rise of consumers’ inflation expectations
between 2009 and 2011 due to the increase in oil prices in this period. Also, while macro-variables are likely
to be affected by non-classical measurement error, agents’ expectations, as captured by consumers’ and
11The price index for total consumer price (headline) inflation pit is decomposed as
pit = pict +υ1pi
en
t +υ2pi
f ood
t , (11)
where pict is core CPI inflation, and pient and pi
f ood
t are, respectively, the growth rate for prices of consumer
energy goods and services and prices of food, both expressed relative to core CPI prices; and υ1, and υ2 are
the weights of energy and food in total consumption. In the rest of the paper we focus on the energy price
component and abstract from food prices. Interestingly, both commodities are subject to the effect of global
factors and a few papers have reported a substantial share of co-movement between energy and food prices
(see, for example, Baumeister and Kilian, 2014).
12While the Federal Reserve’s inflation objective is defined in terms of the overall change in consumer
prices, core inflation is considered to provide a better indicator than total inflation for the developments in
prices, in the medium term.
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professional forecasters’ surveys, are likely to be only partially in line with national accounting definitions
of aggregate prices and can introduce measurement errors and biases of a different nature.13
In the next section, we present an empirical model that expands on the core model to accommodate these
possibly important aspects of business cycle and inflation dynamics.
3 An Empirical Trend-Cycle Model
Our benchmark empirical model expands on the core rational expectations model presented in the previous
section to incorporate a rich information set including output, employment, and the unemployment rate – as
measures of real activity and labor market developments –, CPI inflation, core CPI inflation and consumers’
and professionals’ forecasts for one year ahead inflation – as proxies for economic agents’ inflation expect-
ations –, and oil prices to proxy for energy prices. To capture the complex dynamics relationships among
the variables, we generalise the stylised model presented in the previous section by incorporating dynamic
heterogeneity in the relationship linking real variables, labour market outcomes, and prices and by allowing
for deviations from perfect rationality.
Our model provides an empirical specification of a number of key macroeconomic concepts. A unit
root trend with drift provides a time varying measure of output potential, while the trend in employ-
ment/unemployment captures the evolution of equilibrium unemployment. The cyclical component of un-
employment connects to fluctuations in output at business cycle frequency via an Okun’s law that involves
the output gap and its lagged value. This allows business cycle fluctuation to have dynamic heterogeneity
and the labour market to respond with a lag to the slack in the economy. A unit root trend – common to
headline and core CPI inflation, and inflation expectations – captures the inflation trend shaping long term
expectations. The slack in the economy is reflected in the short-run cyclical fluctuations of inflation (and ex-
pectations) via a Phillips curve relationship involving the output gap and its lagged value that accommodates
for a slow adjustment of prices to slack, in the presence of nominal rigidities. Also, oil prices are allowed to
co-move along the business cycle and possibly its lagged value, due to demand effects or mark-up shocks.
13For example, especially in consumer surveys the forecast horizon may be loosely defined while the
relevant price index may be left unspecified. Also, projections are often reported at different frequencies
and can have different forecasting points.
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The fact that the cyclical component of output informs economy-wide lead-lag fluctuations in both labour
market and nominal variables supports the interpretation of the output gap as a measure of the business
cycle.
[Table 1 about here.]
We also design the model to be able to account for several potential deviations from the rational expect-
ations benchmark. In particular, we allow for (i) oil price disturbances to affect prices either directly via
energy prices in headline CPI, or via economic agents’ forecasts by inducing a transitory disanchoring of
expectations, with a stationary cycle connecting oil prices, expectations, and inflation but not the measure of
slack in the economy; (ii) a time varying bias i.e. a permanent disanchoring of expectations in the form of
unit root processes; (iii) non-classic measurement error in the variables and other sources of coloured noise.
We summarise these modelling choices in the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 CPI headline inflation, core CPI inflation and agents’ inflation expectations (consumers’ and
professional forecasters’) share a common random walk trend (viz. trend inflation).
Assumption 2 Real output, employment, and unemployment have independent trends modelled with unit
roots, with a drift for output and employment (i.e. potential output and equilibrium employ-
ment/unemployment respectively).
Assumption 3 Business cycle fluctuations in output are described by a stationary process with stochastic
cycle in the form of an ARMA(2,1) process with complex roots (i.e. output gap).
Assumption 4 Inflation, inflation expectations, and output are connected by a Phillips curve relationship
defined as a moving average of the output gap and its first lag.
Assumption 5 Labour market variables are linked to output via the Okun’s Law defined as a moving
average of the output gap and its first lag.
Assumption 6 Oil prices co-move with the business cycle via a a moving average of the output gap and its
firs lag (business cycle component of oil prices).
Assumption 7 Inflation expectations and inflation are connected, via a moving average of order one, to an
ARMA(2,1) cycle in oil prices (Energy cycle).
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Assumption 8 All variables can have an idiosyncratic ARMA(2,1) cycle component, possibly capturing
non-classic measurement error, differences in definitions and other sources of noise.
Assumption 9 Agents’ (consumers and professional forecasters) expectations have independent idiosyn-
cratic unit roots without drift, capturing time varying bias in the forecast.
Assumption 10 All components are mutually orthogonal.
A key and novel feature of our modelling strategy is to allow the oil prices to affect and be affected by
both the standard business cycles and what we define as an energy price cycle. Fluctuations in the latter
component are reflected in prices and inflation expectations without affecting output and the labour market.
This orthogonality assumption is a convenient statistical device helpful in teasing out components in the
price dynamics which have weak or negligible impact on the US output gap and labour market, and that
may happen at frequencies different from those of the standard business cycle frequency range.
For the purpose of this analysis the University of Michigan (UoM) consumer survey and the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional Forecasts (SPF) one year ahead inflation forecast were
chosen as proxies for consumers’ and professionals’ expectations. This because they both have relatively
long histories and are available at quarterly frequency. Both of them target CPI inflation, either explicitly
as is the case for the SPF or, implicitly, by surveying consumers, as is the case for UoM. For both surveys,
we employ the median expected price change in the four quarters following the date of the survey, which is
consistent with our use of year-on-year inflation. Data incorporated in the model are at quarterly frequency,
with the sample starting in Q1 1984 and ending in Q2 2018. All variables enter the model in levels, except
for price variables which are transformed to the year-on-year inflation rate (see Table 1 for details).
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Our model in xt := {yt ,et ,ut ,oilt ,pit ,pict ,Fuomt pit+4,Fsp ft pit+4} can be written as

yt
et
ut
oilt
pit
pict
Fuomt pit+4
Fsp ft pit+4

=

1 0 0
δe,1+δe,2L 0 0
δu,1+δu,2L 0 0
δoil,1+δoil,2L 1 0
δpi,1+δpi,2L γpi,1+ γpi,2L φpi
δpic,1+δpic,2L γpic,1+ γpic,2L φpic
δuom,1+δuom,2L+δuom,3L2 γuom,1+ γuom,2L φuom
δsp f ,1+δsp f ,2L+δsp f ,3L2 γsp f ,1+ γsp f ,2L φsp f


ψ̂t
ψEPt
µpit
+

ψyt
ψet
ψut
ψoilt
ψpit
ψpict
ψuomt
ψsp ft

+

µyt
µet
µut
µoilt
0
0
µuomt
µsp ft

(12)
where φpi , φpic , φuom, and φsp f are normalised to have unitary loading of inflation and inflation expectations
on trend inflation.14 It is worth noting that our empirical specification in Equation 12 would reduce to the
stylised rational expectations model in Equation 8, under suitable parametric restrictions. In the Online
Appendix D, we report a number of simplified models and their estimation results to show how different
assumptions impact on the final specification of the model.
Like the output gap in Equation 6, the energy cycle and the idiosyncratic ARMA(2,1) stationary cycles
can be written in the following form:
ψ jt
ψ∗ jt
= ρ j
 cos(λ j) sin(λ j)
−sin(λ j) cos(λ j)

ψ jt−1
ψ∗ jt−1
+
 v jt
v∗ jt
 ,
 v jt
v∗ jt
∼N (0,ς2j I2) (13)
where j ∈ {EP,x1, . . . ,xn} and ψ∗ j, as discussed, is a term capturing an auxiliary cycle. For stationarity, we
impose 0 < λ j ≤ pi and 0 < ρ j < 1 for all cycles, including the output gap.
There are four main advantages to modelling the stationary components as restricted ARMA(2,1) pro-
cesses. First, this representation nests an AR(2) that is the simplest linear process able of displaying pseudo-
cyclical behaviour of the type it is associated with the business cycle and other economic cycles. Second, it
allows for an explicit characterisation of the relevant cyclical parameters – frequency and decay rate –, over
14In the empirical model, the series are standardised so that the standard deviations of their first differ-
ences are equal to one. For this reason, we normalise φpi , φpic , φuom, and φsp f to the reciprocal of the standard
deviation of the first difference of the respective variable.
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which it is possible to specify transparent priors. Third, it is a very parsimonious representation with a small
number of parameters and hence the estimation of many stationary components is computationally feasible.
Fourth, the presence of an additional MA(1) component is potentially able to accommodate for additional
persistence in the data.
As discussed, the common and idiosyncratic trends are random walks (with/without drifts – µ j0) that can
be written as
µ jt = µ
j
0 +µ
j
t−1+u
j
t , u
j
t ∼N (0,σ2j ) .
All of the stochastic disturbances in the model are assumed to be mutually orthogonal and Gaussian. Fi-
nally, it is worth noting that the common and idiosyncratic trends in inflation and inflation expectations are
identified up to a constant (see Bai and Wang, 2015, for a discussion on identification). For the sake of
interpretation, we attribute the constant to the common trend so that it is on the same scale as the observed
inflation variables.
4 Bringing the Model to the Data
[Table 2 about here.]
Our estimation strategy builds on the approach recently suggested by Harvey et al. (2007), that adopts
modern Bayesian techniques to support the estimation of ‘structural’ trend-cycle models à la Harvey (1985).
In estimating the model, we elicit prior distributions that are either uniform over the range of the model
parameters compatible with our modelling choices (i.e. 0 < λ j ≤ pi and 0 < ρ j < 1), or weakly informative
and in the form of very diffuse Normal and Inverse Gamma priors. Table 2 reports the parameters of our
prior distributions.
We maximise and simulate the posterior distributions with a Metropolis-Within-Gibbs algorithm that
is structured in two blocks. In the first block, we estimate the state space parameters by the Metropolis
algorithm and, in the second block, we use the Gibbs algorithm to draw unobserved states conditional on
model parameters. Relevant details and references are in the text and Appendix Appendix A.15
15The lags for the survey variables in Equation 12 are implemented by including the auxiliary cycle ψ∗ jt
from Equation 13.
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[Figure 1 about here.]
An important question concerns the role of the priors in identifying the model. Figure 1 illustrates prior
and posterior distributions for the variance of the error terms of the unobserved components, the frequency
and persistence of the two common cycles, and the coefficients for the common cycles.16 The charts provide
a good indication on whether data provide enough information to identify the model parameters. Indeed,
the posterior distributions are well peaked and not shaped by the priors, and show that the data is very
informative in estimating the many parameters of the model – in particular the variance of the shocks of
the common components and the frequencies of the cycles. Importantly, the posterior distributions of the
coefficients for the common cycles indicate that coefficients equal to zero have negligible probability to be
drawn in both cases. Moreover, our results are robust to changes in the parameters of the distributions of the
more informative priors. See Appendix Appendix C.
5 Trends and Cycles in the US Economy
We start by analysing economic trends identified and estimated by the model in the next section and then
move to economic cycles in the following one. We compare our assessment of trend-cycle dynamics with
the estimates by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve.
5.1 Trend Inflation, Equilibrium Unemployment, GDP Potential
[Figure 2 about here.]
The model delivers very smooth and stable trends. Figure 2 plots real GDP, employment, unemploy-
ment, and oil prices against the median of the estimated independent trends, along with coverage bands (at
68% darker shade, and at 90% lighter shade coverage rate). Output trend, which can be thought of as a
measure of potential output, is compared with the corresponding measure provided by the CBO. While both
trends are equally stable, they provide a different description of long term growth in the US. Since 2001,
the model-implied trend lies below the CBO trend implying that, while the CBO’s reading of the data is
16The posterior distributions of the full set of model parameters can be found in Appendix Appendix B.
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that the US economy had only just reached its potential at the pre-crisis peak in 2008, our model signals an
overheating of the economy from 2006 to 2008 and a marked slow-down of trend growth in the last part of
the sample.
Figure 2 also compares the model-implied measure of equilibrium unemployment against the CBO’s
measure for the natural rate of unemployment (NAIRU). The two measures coincide in the first part of
the sample while they diverge post-2000. While our model provides a very stable unemployment trend
hoovering around 6% and with a temporary and small increase around the financial crisis in 2008, the CBO
NAIRU shows a slow and persistent decline of the trend continuing through the crisis.17
[Figure 3 about here.]
The trend in the oil price shows a hump-shaped increase in the second half of the sample that may be
related to the global increase in oil demand post-2000. In our model, trends are jointly estimated with the
cyclical components. Hence, the differences between our estimated trends and those of the Fed and the CBO
have relevant implications for the reading of business cycle dynamics. This will be analysed in Section 5.5.
The inflation trend common to headline CPI, core CPI inflation, and consumers’ and professional fore-
casters’ inflation expectation variables is shown in Figure 3. Trend inflation is roughly stable from 2000
to 2010 and, interestingly, is closely tracked by the SPF median forecast. UoM expectations, on the other
hand, show large and persistent deviations from the common trend (long-term inflation expectations) since
2004. We interpret this sizeable time-varying idiosyncratic trend as a bias in consumers’ expectations. The
unit-root inflation trend can be connected to the long-term inflation expectations of rational agents under
the assumption that the ‘law of iterated expectations’ holds (see Beveridge and Nelson, 1981 and Mertens,
2016). This interpretation is supported by Figure 4 where CPI inflation is plotted against the implied trend
17In the baseline model we include employment measured as number of employed people. However,
an important concern relates to the behaviour of the employment-to-population ratio (or active population),
which has shown a marked decline since the Great Recession, standing at 61% in November 2019 down
from a pre-crisis level at 63%. In a robustness exercise reported in the Online Appendix E, we substitute
employment with employment-to-population ratio in the model. While all of the results reported in this
section are robust to the inclusion of this variable, the model captures a persistent decline in the equilibrium
trend of the participation rate, following the Great Recession.
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and the median 10-year ahead SPF inflation forecast. The chart provides a visual validation of our interpret-
ation that the model trend estimate captures long-term expectations.
[Figure 4 about here.]
5.2 Business and Energy Price Cycles
[Figure 5 about here.]
Figure 5 shows the estimated common cycles in both the time and frequency domains, and their con-
tribution in headline CPI inflation. The first cycle provides a direct measure of the slack in the economy
and captures fluctuations of output around its potential. It also connects real, labour market, and nominal
variables and hence can be interpreted as a measure of the business cycle. For this reason, in what follows,
we refer to it as ‘business cycle’ with a slight abuse of terminology. The upper and middle charts in Fig-
ures 5 report the median of the posterior distribution of the business and energy price cycles with relative
coverage intervals at 68% coverage (dark shade) and 90% coverage (light shade). The lower chart shows
the associated spectral densities and coverage bands. The charts indicate that the ‘business cycle’ is quite
regular and much less volatile than the energy price cycle. The spectral shape shows that the business cycle
contributes to the inflation spectral shape with a relatively well defined peak and with a cycle between 7 and
8 years periodicity. Conversely, the energy price cycle occupies a broader range of frequencies with a less
well defined peak and a periodicity about half as long as that of the business cycle.
5.3 Historical Decomposition
[Figure 6 about here.]
Figure 6 shows the historical decomposition of the stationary components of the eight variables of in-
terest into common and idiosyncratic cycles, as provided by the model. First, the business cycle captures
almost entirely the fluctuations around trend in real output, employment and unemployment. A negligible
idiosyncratic component is visible only in unemployment and almost non-existent in output and employ-
ment. This indicates that our measure of the output gap captures the slack in the economy well and is
transmitted, via the lagged Okun’s law relationship to the labour market. It should be stressed that lags
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are important in describing the delayed transmission from output dynamics to the labour market and may
capture different types of labour market frictions.
Second, a non negligible share of oil price fluctuations is due to the comovement of this variable with
the slack in the economy, along the business cycle. This may be due either to the demand effect of the US
economy onto global oil prices, or the role of oil shocks as mark-up shocks in the aggregate production
function.
[Figure 7 about here.]
Third, the slack in the economy is reflected in price dynamics via the Phillips curve which captures the
lower frequency dynamics in the inflation cycle and accounts for a sizeable share of the variation in CPI
inflation and most of the variation in core CPI inflation. This ‘real’ component dominates SPF expectations
while it provides a sizeable but not dominant share of variation in consumers’ expectations. In our model the
Phillips curve is a lagged relationship connecting prices, expectations and output and hence labour market
variables, in the spirit of the empirical relationship uncovered by Phillips (1958). A discussion about its
‘steepness’ may be slightly misleading since a reduced form relation between prices and unemployment
would involve different lags of our business cycle. Nonetheless, in Figure 7, we compare a scatter plot
showing how the business cycle components of CPI and unemployment would be related with a scatter plot
of (demeaned) CPI and unemployment variables. The linear fit has a slope of -0.39 for the model based
measures, against a slope of -0.14 for a naïve estimate.18 This is a rough way to assess the strength of the
Phillips curve identified by our model against that of a naïve estimate of its steepness.
Fourth, the stationary component of CPI inflation is dominated by the energy price cycle. This can be
explained by the fact that energy prices are one of the components of the CPI basket and tend to be extremely
volatile with a weak correlation with the slack in the national economy. Notice also that, while small, the
energy price component is also visible and non-negligible in core CPI inflation where, by construction,
energy prices are removed. This suggests that oil shocks impact core CPI inflation indirectly via expectations
and not via the output gap or other measures of slack in the economy. In fact, as suggested by Coibion and
18The black full circles represent points the the post Great Recession subsample (from 2008 to 2018).
Interestingly, the years since the beginning of the last recession seem to be described by the ‘regular pattern’
in the data, albeit they trace a larger than usual ‘cycle’.
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Gorodnichenko (2015), household expectations are not fully anchored and respond strongly to oil price
changes. Conversely, as observed above, the SPF median forecast tracks the unit-root trends while its
cyclical component is dominated by the persistent business cycle component. In other words, the SPF
forecasts are relatively unaffected by the volatile and less persistent energy price component. In this respect,
the dynamics of the median SPF forecast seem to be consistent with a rational forecast.
Finally, overall, the cyclical part of inflation is well captured by the two common components and little
is left to idiosyncratic forces. However, the two common cycles are not in any sense ‘synchronised’. This
sheds light on some of the puzzling behaviour of inflation since 2008. From 2011 to mid 2012 the inflation
cycle is supported by oil prices while the Phillips curve exerts negative pressure. The opposite is true from
2015 to the end of 2016 when oil prices drag inflation down while the Phillips curve exerts a small upward
pressure.
5.4 The Role of Oil
Oil shocks can impact price dynamics via several different channels. First, as cost-push shocks in produc-
tion, they impact prices via the Phillips curve. Also, oil prices can fluctuate due to US internal demand along
the business cycle. These channels are directly captured by the common business cycle that connects the
slack in the economy to oil prices and inflation. Secondly, they directly affect the prices of energy services
which enter the consumption basket of headline CPI without affecting the output gap. This second channel
is likely to explain most of the contribution of the energy price cycle to headline CPI inflation. Thirdly,
they can generate ‘non-fundamental’ movement in consumers’ inflation expectations and shift prices via
this mechanism. This third channel is likely to explain the energy price cycle component in consumers’
expectations and, importantly, in core CPI inflation which excludes energy prices. Overall, this channel
is quantitatively non dominant in price dynamics albeit potentially very important since it is not under the
control of standard monetary policy.
[Figure 8 about here.]
Much of the historical differences in inflation expectations between households and professional fore-
casters can be accounted for by the contribution of oil prices. This was originally observed by Coibion
and Gorodnichenko (2015) who also attribute to oil shocks a sizeable effect on consumer expectations. In
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our framework the effect can only be present through common stationary cycles and trends. However, our
results show that there is a large idiosyncratic trend component in oil prices which, by construction, does not
affect CPI inflation. Figure 8 plots it against the idiosyncratic consumers’ expectation trend and provides
suggestive evidence that consumer price expectations may actually have a persistent component related to
oil prices. Our framework leaves it as unmodelled, and to future research.
5.5 The Output Gap and a Narrative of the Great Recession
[Figure 9 about here.]
In the narrative emerging from the model, the output gap has a crucial role. Figure 9 reports the model-
based output gap as well as the gap published by the CBO and the one by the Fed Greenbooks. The model’s
and the CBO/Fed business cycle dating of the turning points perfectly coincide as the peaks and troughs
alignment shows. However, the model-consistent measure and the other two differ in their assessment of
the the degree of slack in the economy since 2001. In fact, at the time of the slowdown of 2001-2002, our
model indicates that the economy went from over-capacity to trend growth but, unlike the CBO’s, does not
identify a protracted period of slack.
Notably the model attributes a smaller share of the reduction in GDP following the Great Recession
to its cyclical component – as compared as the CBO’s and by the Fed Greenbook’s estimates – and hence
projects a lower output potential with a marked slow down in output trend growth that starts before last
recession but that becomes manifest in its aftermath (in Figure 2 and Figure 9). The CBO has a more
optimistic assessment of the trend growth and attributes the slowdown since the early millennium to a very
deep contraction in the cyclical component of output. Its estimated output gap considers the US economy
to have been below potential since 2001 and even at the height of the peak preceding the Great Recession,
when the US economy was supported by the unusual dynamics in the real estate market.
It is important to observe that the two different narratives are the specular image of the question regarding
the stability of the Phillips curve. Our model’s estimate of the output gap is informed by loose priors on
trends, the inflation trends implicit in agents’ expectations, and above all the multivariate links connecting
prices to the labour market and to output. In doing this, it assumes the stability of the Phillips’s curve
and of the Okun’s Law. It finds that the data matches this description but shows a substantial decline
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in output potential (and a roughly constant equilibrium unemployment). Conversely, a view of the US
economy assuming a very stable potential output would imply a widening output gap and hence a flattening
of the Phillips Curve. Both interpretations are plausible. The two different narratives of the economic
developments since 2001 are based on different and untestable assumptions about the long run behaviour of
output and other variables and there is no obvious criterion on the basis of which we can choose the ‘correct’
one (see, for example, the discussion on trends in Sims, 2000).
Several narratives are compatible with the model’s assessment. For example, Hall et al. (2017) have
pointed to a lower productivity growth trend preceding the Great Recession and, using a growth accounting
framework, have argued that the slowdown was due to the long-term trend in labour force participation
and TFP growth. The slowdown in the pre-Great Recession period may have been masked by the dot-com
bubble first and the financial boom later, possibly in line with Borio et al. (2017). This ‘productivity view’
is captured in our model by a trend slow-down starting at the beginning of the millennium. In addition,
the model attributes part of the slowdown since 2008 to the trend, in line with the ‘hysteresis view’ on the
post-crisis period according to which deep recessions can cause hysteresis in the form of permanent (or very
persistent) changes to potential output (see the discussion in Blanchard et al., 2015, as an example).19
Let us stress here that one should not see our results as supporting the view that the Great Recession was
mild, given our estimate of the output gap. Rather, our results support a pessimistic assessment of long-run
trends in the wake of the financial crisis, although the model is unable to identify whether the source this
persistent slow-down are demand or supply factors (see also the discussion in Coibion et al., 2018).20
19Blanchard et al. (2015) using multi country data but not a model based approach conclude that sev-
eral recessions of different nature are followed by lower growth. They conclude that “in many cases, the
correlation between recessions and subsequent poor economic performance reflects reverse causality: the
realization that growth prospects are lower than was previously assumed naturally leads to both a recession
and subsequent poor performance.” However, in other cases “hysteresis, and perhaps even super-hysteresis
may indeed also be at work.”
20Coibion et al. (2018) observe that “one should draw little inference from the evolution of estimates
of potential GDP about the persistence of GDP changes; these estimates fail to exclusively identify supply
shocks that should drive potential GDP and instead also respond to transitory demand shocks. The fact that
most of the output declines observed since the Great Recession are now attributed to declines in potential
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6 Global Factors in US Inflation
[Figure 10 about here.]
In recent years, the potential impact of globalisation on price dynamics has drawn attention from both
policymakers and academics. The literature has suggested that the increase in international trade has neg-
atively impacted the strength of the domestic Phillips curve relationship and increased the significance of
‘global slack’ and exchange rates in relation to CPI. Several channels have been proposed including the
increasing impact of demand from emerging markets that has affected volatility in commodity prices, the
increased price competition and the greater role of supply chains have reduced firms’ pricing power, or that
the reduced bargaining power of local workers has weakened the role for domestic slack (see Galí, 2010, for
a theory-informed discussion of the literature on the topic).
Indeed, a number of empirical works have identified a sizeable global common factor in inflation dy-
namics (e.g. Ciccarelli and Mojon, 2010, and Mumtaz et al., 2011), or proposed to add a measure of global
slack (e.g. Borio and Filardo, 2007, Castelnuovo, 2010), supply chain intensity (e.g. Auer and Fischer,
2010; Auer et al., 2017) or exchange rates (e.g. Forbes et al., 2017) in the econometric specifications of
price equations.
In our analysis we have so far abstracted from these considerations. We instead focussed on the energy
price cycle which we extracted as a process that is orthogonal to domestic slack and not reflected in the
output gap and in the labour market conditions in the US. An important question is whether the energy price
cycle reflects global demand and commodity price cycles, as suggested, for example, by Delle Chiaie et al.
(2018). To try and address this question, we estimate a new version of the model that expands the benchmark
specification by including the two different measures of global activity: (i) the Baltic Dry Index and index
of global cargo shipments, initially proposed by Kilian (2009) but taken in levels; (ii) the measure of Global
Industrial Production proposed by Baumeister and Hamilton (2019) and based on the OECD methodology.21
GDP would imply little, other than that these declines have been persistent because estimates of potential
GDP fail to adequately distinguish between the underlying sources of changes in GDP.”
21In an explorative analysis reported in the Online Appendix F, we provide scatter-plots and correlation
coefficients for the business and the energy price cycles in relation to three variables measuring global
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In this new specification, all the variables in the model are allowed to load onto the US business cycle as
a reflection of the global significance of the US economy both in terms of share of world GDP and as driver
of global economic activity. As in the benchmark specification, US GDP and labour market variables do not
load on the energy price cycle, while all the others – including the Baltic Dry Index and global industrial
production – can have an impact on it.22
In the new specification, the decomposition of the US variables in terms of the BC and the EP is largely
unchanged, despite the introduction of global variables, as reported in Figure 10. This is reassuring and
shows that results are robust. However, the new model offers interesting insights on the role of global shocks
in the US inflation dynamics. First, the US business cycle drives a large portion of the global economy and
hence of the global business cycle fluctuations. This is visible in the large share of the two global indicators
explained by the US business cycle component and that is due to both the US weight in world GDP but
also to the share of the global activity that is synchronised on the US business cycle. Second, the energy
price cycle now explains a sizeable share of the Baltic Dry Index and oil prices but a smaller share of Global
Industrial Production. A possible interpretation is that the fluctuations captured by the energy price cycle
are due to oil supply shocks and possibly financial shocks in the commodity markets, rather than to global
demand factors. Interestingly, in the global model, the spectral shape of the energy price cycle is well defined
and peaks in a range higher than business cycle frequencies.
7 Concluding Comments
The results reported in this paper point to a well identified and steep Phillips curve relationship in reduced
form, which captures a cyclical component CPI inflation with maximum power at around eight years peri-
odicity but also point to deviations from the standard rational expectations formulation since we identify
a sizeable cycle in CPI inflation which is unrelated to real domestic variables and captures the correlation
between inflation expectations and oil prices. This cycle, which is of slightly shorter periodicity than the
business cycle and is more volatile, points to a channel through which oil price developments temporarily
activity: (i) the Baltic Dry Index; (ii) the global industrial production (GIP); and (iii) the Global Condition
Index (GCI) of Cuba-Borda et al. (2018).
22The Online Appendix F reports details of the model and additional charts.
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affect consumer price expectations away from the nominal-real relationship captured by the Phillips curve.
In the presence of large oil price shocks this component may dominate and cloud the signal on cyclical
inflation. The energy price component appears to be determined by global factors such as oil supply shocks
and financial shocks in the commodity markets.
Interestingly, this energy price cycle is associated to both core and CPI inflation which suggests that even
core inflation provides a clouded signal of fundamental (trend and cyclically driven) inflationary pressures.
This result provides motivation to the signal extraction approach we have proposed for the identification
of the cyclical component of inflation. As for the real variables, the model’s estimate of potential output
identifies a slowdown around the beginning of the millennium that becomes more evident in the wake of the
Great Recession. Our results are compatible with both the ‘productivity view’ of Hall et al. (2017) and the
‘hysteresis view’ of Blanchard et al. (2015). The implication is that our estimate of the output gap differs
from that of the CBO’s since the beginning of the productivity slow-down. While the CBO’s view is that the
US economy was growing around potential before the 2008 crisis and below it since then, our model points
to growth above potential between 2006 and 2008 and again since 2015.
Although it is not possible to discriminate between these different views that ultimately depend on
different beliefs on the long-run behaviour of output, our model – based on the joint analysis of output,
labor market, prices and expectations – provides a plausible narrative which is consistent with the data and
that can be interpreted in a transparent way. We believe that as such it provides a useful model-consistent
benchmark for the policy debate.
From the policy perspective, our findings suggest that a problematic issue for the central bank is that,
facing volatile and persistent oil price dynamics, consumer expectations can deviate from a stable trend and
affect price dynamics. Our conclusions are therefore quite open-ended. The Fed’s view that inflation is
dominated by three components is supported by the data. However, the ability of the Central Bank to anchor
expectations is limited especially because oil affects consumer expectations persistently and independently
from the state of the real economy.
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Figure 1: Prior and posterior distributions. Prior distributions (dotted) and posterior distributions
(solid) of the coefficients for the common cycles of CPI inflation and Core CPI inflation, frequency
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cycles, and common trend.
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Figure 2: Independent trends of output, employment, unemployment, and oil prices (dotted), with
coverage intervals at 68% coverage (dark shade) and 90% coverage (light shade), as estimated by
the model. The chart also reports the measures of potential outputs and NAIRU estimated by the
CBO (dash-dot).
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Figure 3: Trend common to CPI inflation, core CPI inflation, and inflation expectations (dotted),
with coverage intervals at 68% coverage (dark shade) and 90% coverage (light shade), as estimated
by the model.
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Figure 6: Historical decomposition of the cycles, as estimated by the model. The chart reports the
Business cycle, Energy price cycle, and Idiosyncratic cycle.
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Figure 7: This chart plots the Business cycle component of CPI inflation against the Business cycle
component of the unemployment rate (black empty circles) and the corresponding bivariate linear
regression line (black line). The black full circles represent points for the post Great Recession
subsample (from 2008 to 2018). The chart also plots demeaned CPI inflation against the demeaned
unemployment rate (grey crosses) and the corresponding bivariate linear regression line (grey line).
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erage intervals at 68% coverage (dark shade) and 90% coverage (light shade), as estimated by the
model.
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Figure 9: Output gap (dotted), with coverage intervals at 68% coverage (dark shade) and 90%
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Figure 10: Historical decomposition of the cycles, as estimated by the model. The chart reports
the Business cycle, Energy price cycle, and idiosyncratic cycle.
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Table 1: Data and transformations
Variable Symbol Mnemonic Transformation
Real GDP yt y Levels
Employment et e Levels
Unemployment rate ut u Levels
Oil price oilt oil Levels
CPI inflation pit pi YoY
Core CPI inflation pict pic YoY
UoM: Expected inflation Fuomt pit+4 uom Levels
SPF: Expected CPI Fsp ft pit+4 sp f Levels
Note: The table lists the macroeconomic variables used in the empirical model. ‘UoM: Expected
inflation’ is the University of Michigan, 12-months ahead expected inflation rate. ‘SPF: Expected
CPI’ is the Survey of Professional Forecasters, 4-quarters ahead expected CPI inflation rate. The
oil price is the West Texas Intermediate Spot oil price.
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Table 2: Prior distributions
Name Support Density Parameter 1 Parameter 2
δ , γ , φ and τ IR Normal 0 1000
σ2 and ς2 (0,∞) Inverse-Gamma 3 1
ρ [0.001,0.970] Uniform 0.001 0.970
λ [0.001,pi] Uniform 0.001 pi
Note: Prior distribution for the model parameters adopted in estimating the model with US data.
All of the priors are uniform over the range of the model parameters compatible with our modelling
or weakly informative. Boundaries of the uniform priors ensure that the stochastic cycles are
stationary and correctly specified according to the restrictions described in Harvey (1990).
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